While riding the bus home with the team, Kennedy posted onFacebook that he thought he might have just been fired for praying. Government justification[s] for interfering with First Amendment rights must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. ____ (2022), Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a consequential opinion for a 6-3 majority upholding the right of a public school football coach to offer a prayer on the 50-yard line after a game. A policy can fail this test if it discriminate[s] on its face, or if a religious exercise is otherwise its object. Lukumi, 508 U.S., at 533; see also Smith, 494 U.S., at 878. App. 97. 3234, 36. It learned that, since his hiring in 2008, Kennedy had been kneeling on the 50-yard line to pray immediately after shaking hands with the opposing team. Krufter Ofen, Kruft, Pellenz, Mayen-Koblenz District, Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany Mineral and/or Locality Mindat.org is an outreach project of the Hudson Institute of Mineralogy , a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization. Second, the Court also does not decide what burden a government employer must shoulder to justify restricting an employees religious expression because the District had no constitutional basis for reprimanding Kennedy under any possibly applicable standard of scrutiny. At that point, the District reacted quickly. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District - LII / Legal Information Institute Ante, at 1819. Kennedy, however, ultimately refused to respond to the Districts suggestions and declined to communicate with the District, except through media appearances. Facts: Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in the Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet personal prayer. The Districts September 17 letter had explained that Kennedy traditionally held up helmets from the BHS and opposing teams while players from each team kneeled around him. See id., at 90. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike. 1930. When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the Courts cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. While we have many public-employee precedents addressing how the interest-balancing test set out in Pickering v. Board of Ed. 105. . The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny, meaning that [i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools. Id. For over seven years, no one complained to the Bremerton School District (District) about these practices. App. Sometimes team members invited opposing players to join. See id., at 6364. Id., at 12381239. Precedent long has recognized that endorsement concerns under the Establishment Clause, properly understood, bear no relation to a hecklers veto. Ante, as 22. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Courts conclusion (and the Districts concession) that Mr. Kennedys actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, check a text, socialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities. See Part IB, supra. A rule that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always been part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society. Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U.S. 577, 590. The opinion of the Court simply applied the longstanding rule that, when the government does not speak for itself, it cannot exclude speech based on the speechs religious viewpoint. Shurtleff, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S., at 112). As his October 14 letter and subsequent actions made clear, Kennedy attempted to hew as closely to his past practice as possible, taking a knee at the same time and place as previously, and in the same manner that initially drew students to join him and by improperly permitting spectators to join him on the field. . Id., at 3031. . The District asks the Court to apply to Mr. Kennedys claims the more lenient second-step PickeringGarcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., SantaFe, 530 U.S., at 305; Wallace, 472 U.S., at 6061; Edwards, 482 U.S., at 578, 593; see also Lee, 505 U.S., at 618619 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that many of the Courts Establishment Clause holdings in the school context are concerned not with whether the policy in question coerced students to participate in prayer but with whether it convey[ed] a message of state approval of prayer activities in the public schools (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S., at 61)).4 No subsequent decisions in other contexts, including the cases about monuments and legislative meetings on which the Court relies, have so much as questioned the application of this core Establishment Clause concern in the context of public schools. He did not speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to convey a government-created message. Students look up to their teachers and coaches as role models and seek their approval. See ante, at 2021. He contended, as relevant, that the District violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. But that concern supplies no excuse to adorn the Constitution with rules not supported by its terms and the traditions undergirding them. It expressed appreciation for his efforts to comply with the Districts directives, including avoiding on-the-job prayer with players in the. It errs by assessing them divorced from the context and history of Kennedys prayer practice. . Id., at 77. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his First Amendment claims. The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities. He asked the District to allow him to continue that private religious expression alone. Accordingly, his right to pray at any time and in any manner he wishes while exercising his professional duties is not absolute. 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). Kennedy v. Bremerton School District | The First Amendment Encyclopedia To reiterate, the District did not argue, and neither court below held, that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed . Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least strict scrutiny, showing that its restrictions on the plaintiffs protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. Mr. To the contrary, this Courts Establishment Clause jurisprudence establishes that the government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means. SantaFe, 530 U.S., at 312. We find it unlikely that Mr. Kennedy was fulfilling a responsibility imposed by his employment by praying during a period in which the District has acknowledged that its coaching staff was free to engage in all manner of private speech. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. We do not understand our colleagues to contest that Mr. Kennedy has met his burdens under either the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, but only to suggest the District has carried its own burden to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedys public prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. Post, at 22 (opinion of Sotomayor,J.). The District placed robocalls to parents to inform them that public access to the field is forbidden; it posted signs and made announcements at games saying the same thing; and it had the Bremerton Police secure the field in future games. (slip op., at 1, 45).4. Under the Districts rule, a school would be required to do so. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Brief for Petitioner 26, n. 2. Garcetti, 547 U.S., at 424. Finally, this Court has held that including prayers in student football games is unconstitutional, even when delivered by students rather than staff and even when students themselves initiated the prayer. The District also explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedys part must be nondemonstrative (i.e., not outwardly discernible as religious activity) if students are also engaged in religious conduct in order to avoid the perception of endorsement. Id., at 45. And that, the court held, would amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause. Mr. Kennedy explained that he never told any student that it was important they participate in any religious activity. Ibid. Under this Courts precedents, a plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable. Id., at 879881. . It is not dispositive that Coach Kennedy served as a role model and remained on duty after games. The District instructed Kennedy that any motivational talks to students must remain secular, so as to avoid alienation of any team member. Id., at 44. 114. The Court now charts a different path, yet again paying almost exclusive attention to the Free Exercise Clauses protection for individual religious exercise while giving short shrift to the Establishment Clauses prohibition on state establishment of religion. Ante, at 30, n.7. The county is home to Bahs, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, and many denominations of Christians, as well as numerous residents who are religiously unaffiliated. Accordingly, this Court has emphasized that the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in the dilemma of choosing between participating, with all that implies, or protesting a religious exercise in a public school. The District further noted that [d]uring the time following completion of the game, until players are released to their parents or otherwise allowed to leave the event, Mr. Kennedy, like all coaches, is clearly on duty and paid to continue supervision of students. Id., at 79. . In addition, Kennedys position made him responsible for interacting with members of the community. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). By contrast, in Lane a public employer sought to terminate an employee after he testified at a criminal trial about matters involving his government employment.
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